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The Armed Drone 
Ioannis Kalpouzos* 
 (in J. Hohmann and D. Joyce (eds), International Law’s Objects (Oxford University Press, 
2018)) 
Introduction 
The armed drone, as an object and a symbol, is everywhere: in the news, in popular 
culture, in scholarship. Through and beyond its aesthetic and technical features, this 
chapter argues that the drone signifies the changing relationship between law and 
war. The object communicates a set of promises, of war as precise and asymmetrical 
governance: promises that this chapter assesses and critiques through a discussion 
of the object’s material and symbolic functions.  
The importance of drones for the conduct of war is borne out by practice: the use 
of armed drones in the last fifteen years has developed dramatically. While initially 
developed for intelligence purposes in the mid-1990s, drones were soon armed.1 
* City Law School, City, University of London
	 2	
On February 4, 2002, the CIA first used an unmanned Predator drone in a targeted 
killing.2 Thousands of drone strikes have been recorded since.3 The technology is 
proliferating: Eleven states, including the US, the UK, Israel, Pakistan, China and 
Nigeria, and four non-state actors now own armed drones, with the avowed 
potential of further proliferation.4 What is more, armed drones are the tip of an 
expanding iceberg of unarmed drones used for security and surveillance purposes, 
including by the United Nations in peacekeeping operations. 5  Finally, the 
military/security proliferation lies on a bolstering base of private/commercial 
proliferation: drones delivering packages,6 drones delivering images,7 drones as a 
hobby.8  
 
But it is not just the quantity of armed drones and their use that is of significance. 
It is also the particular quality of this use and the overall policy that they are 
facilitating. Armed drones are seen as part and parcel of, and enmeshed in, particular 
campaigns and strategies of armed force. They are thus associated with a way of 
war that is or seems new and that is or seems in tension with the traditional 
paradigm of war: the borderless, asymmetrical, War on Terror.  
 
Finally, and what is more, the object’s significance cannot be reduced to its use. The 
																																																								
1 The Predator #3034 drone was the first to be armed (with Hellfire missiles) in 2001. See Sue Baker, 
‘Predator Missile Launch Test Totally Successful’ US Air Force (27 February 2001) 
<http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/PubsCats/PM/articles01/afns1m-a.pdf> accessed 16 February 2017.    
2 See further P. Cockburn, Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins (Verso, 2015). See also Richard 
Whittle, Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution (Henry Holt and Co 2014) and P. W. Singer, Wired 
for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (Penguin 2009). 
3 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism is an invaluable source for the recording of drone strikes. See 
<https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/> accessed 16 
November 2016. 
4 A useful database has been compiled by the New America Foundation and can be accessed at 
<http://securitydata.newamerica.net/world-drones.html> accessed 16 February 2017. See also Remote 
Control Project, ‘The Hostile Use of Drones by Non-State Actors against British Targets’ (January 2016) at 
<http://remotecontrolproject.org/report-civilian-drones-at-risk-of-being-used-by-terrorist-and-other-
hostile-groups/> accessed 16 November 2016; E. Schmidt, ‘Papers Offer a Peek at ISIS’ Drones, Lethal and 
Largely Off-the-Shelf, New York Times (31 January 2017) at <	
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/middleeast/isis-drone-documents.html> accessed 16 
February 2017. 
5 See the interview with Hervé Ladsous, The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations in Masimba Tafirenyika, ‘Drones are effective in protecting civilians’ Africa Renewal (April 2016) 
<http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2016/drones-are-effective-protecting-civilians>; 
‘Performance Peacekeeping: Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN 
Peacekeeping’ 22 December 2014 at <http://www.performancepeacekeeping.org/> accessed 16 February 
2017.   
6 Roger Aitken, ‘Delivery Wars: Market “Takes Off” As Amazon Invests In UK Drones & Jets’ Forbes (6 
January 2015) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2016/01/06/delivery-wars-market-takes-off-
as-amazon-invests-in-uk-drones-jets/> accessed 16 November 2016. 
7 Angela Watercutter, ‘Drones are About to Change How Directors Make Movies’ Wired (3 June 2015) 
<http://www.wired.com/2015/03/drone-filmmaking/> accessed 16 November 2016. 
8 Leading to increasing efforts for registration. See European Parliament, ‘Press Release: Drones: guidelines 
for rules on commercial and recreational use and safety’ (29 October 2015) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20151022IPR98819/Drones-guidelines-for-rules-
on-commercial-and-recreational-use-and-safety> accessed 16 November 2016. 
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object’s significance overflows the object’s use through the object’s promise, -- or 
our perception of what the object promises and signifies for the future of war. The 
drone’s perceived promise dominates our debates and is reflected in the object’s 
image. The drone is very real, but it is also a symbol, a myth, a fixture in our 
imagination. Indeed, the very image accompanying this chapter, which is considered 
to be ‘the most widely reproduced image’ of a drone, is tellingly revealed to be a 
construct, a fiction, superimposed on stock images of the Afghan landscape.9 The 
very real object of the armed drone is appropriated, serving as a language to convey 
and debate the hopes and anxieties over what it signifies, namely the new way of 
war. To the extent that this new way of war is accepted as ‘the new paradigm’, the 
object serves Barthes’ ultimate understanding of the myth, namely that ‘in the eyes 
of the myth-consumer…it transforms history into nature’. 10  History can be 
contested; it is ongoing; its course can be altered. Nature is entrenched. The object, 
by compellingly communicating the myth of ‘the new paradigm’, imposes it. 
 
International legal language is at the very center of the tension between the drone’s 
reality and its promise. International legal discourse transforms the object into 
normative meaning – radical or banal; catastrophic or salutary. International law is 
grappling with the tensions, promises and dangers that armed drones pose to its 
categories. As discussed below, international lawyers debate the compatibility of 
(the use of) drones with the principles of distinction and proportionality, their 
contribution to the creation of a borderless battlefield and the effects of this to the 
sovereignty of (weak) states, the classification of combatants and individuals who 
can be targeted, and the overall manifest lack of transparency and accountability in 
their use.  
 
The armed drone’s significance in international law and international legal debate 
can be explored through three perspectives/images: the image of the object itself 
as proliferated in the media, the image(s) the object generates for the targeters, and 
the image of the object for the targeted. The qualities of the object and the images 
it generates (of itself and of others) speak to both the promise and threat that 






9 See Alexis C. Madrigal, ‘The 'Canonical' Image of a Drone Is a Rendering Dressed Up in Photoshop’ The 
Atlantic (20 March 2013) at <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/the-canonical-
image-of-a-drone-is-a-rendering-dressed-up-in-photoshop/274177/> accessed 16 February 2017. 
10 See Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Vintage 2009) 154. This chapter does not purport to follow the Barthian 
theory unfailingly, only to use it in order to enhance the understanding of the significance of the object in 
the present (international legal) discourse. See ibid. 131 et seq and 143. 
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Perspective 1  
The object itself: A neutrally aggressive, remotely piloted robot. 
 
The image present at the click of the mouse, including on the websites of military 
technology corporations,11 suggests a sharp high-tech knife. The drone’s sinister 
aesthetic promises a combination of the necessary aggression with cold precision. 
It promises a high degree of professionalism in conducting the business that is war. 
It further promises ‘zero-casualties’ for one side, combined with a professional 
adherence to the principles of distinction and proportionality at the other end.12 It 
is a tool of governance, through war. 
 
At one level, the armed drone is just another aircraft mounted with weapons. As 
such it is placed in the historical trajectory of air power and air bombardment. 
International law has attempted to regulate this method of warfare from its very 
early stages.13 Indeed, the central legal categories of the law of targeting, namely the 
rules of distinction between military and civilian targets14 and proportionality in the 
incidental loss of civilian life15 are part and parcel of air warfare.16 What is more, the 
drone can be seen as belonging to a trajectory of distancing and ‘bombing from 
afar’ which has been present in air warfare from early on.17 The accentuation of this 
trajectory, in the period immediately preceding the production of modern drones, 
is the source of legal and moral anxieties. ‘Smart bombs’ and riskless warfare, as 
exemplified in the Kosovo war, highlighted the potential of air power in decisively 
determining battle outcome through precise bombing, while minimizing the risk to 
																																																								
11 See the images presented on the homepage of the Predator’s manufacturer’s General Atomics Aeronautical 
<http://www.ga-asi.com> accessed 16 November 2016.  
12 John O. Brennan, (Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, US), ‘The 
efficacy and ethics of US counterterrorism strategy’, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, (30 April 
2012) in Jameel Jaffer (ed.), The Drone Memos (The New Press, 2016) 199, 207: “it is hard to imagine a tool 
that can better minimize the risk to civilians”; Harold Hongju Koh (US State Department Legal Advisor), 
‘The Obama Administration and International Law, Address at Annual  Meeting of the American  Society  
of  International  Law’ (25 March 2010) in id., 119.. 
13 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1923, in D. Schindler & J. Toman (Eds), The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A 
Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Martinus Nijhoff, 4th edn, 2004), 317. For a recent 
codification see Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Air and Missile Warfare (CUP 2013).  
14 See article 48 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (12 December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 
UNTS 3) (API) and rule 1 of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Study in Customary 
International Humanitarian Law: “The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and 
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.” 
See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswarld-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: 
Rules, (CUP, 2005), 3. 
15 See articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a) of API and rule 14 of the ICRC’s study: “Rule 14. Launching an attack 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated, is prohibited”, supra note 14, 46. 
16 See article 49(3) of API.  
17 Charles D. Link, “Maturing Aerospace Power,” Air and Space Power Journal, September 4, 2001. 
	 5	
the targeters through increasing the distance from the target. This potential, and the 
asymmetry involved, exemplified the dilemmas of killing from afar.18 Moreover, the 
debate in the US administration in the 1980s over the targeted killing of specific 
individuals, and its distinction from proscribed ‘assassinations’, informed and 
preceded the 1990s’ ‘frantic development of a particular military technology’.19 The 
Predator drone was the culmination of this process and the fulfillment of ‘the 
promise of air power’.20   
 
The ‘promise of air power’ is starkly reflected in the armed drone’s design. While 
its inevitably phallic shape21 conveys the necessary aggression of war, its sleek and 
neutral aesthetic tempers it with the impression of cold professionalism. Part of this 
professionalism is, of course, that of law and lawyers. Targeting is an activity which 
has been increasingly regulated, not only through subjection to legal rules, but 
through the involvement of lawyers in decision making at different levels and stages 
of the targeting process. 22  The increasing legalization of targeting does not 
necessarily contribute to limiting the use of armed force or to the perceived 
legitimacy of its effects. 23  Legalization and professionalisation of targeting, as 
reflected in the armed drone’s image and use, does, however, reflect how both the 
enabling and limiting functions of the international law of armed conflict are 
increasingly informing policy. 
  
While the object resembles a warplane, it is also unlike a warplane – in its 
dimensions and in its materiality. Most drones are significantly smaller and lighter 
than an average warplane.24 Importantly, there is no space and no place on it for a 
human being. The pilot is not part of the object. She is in fact removed, operating 
it from a distance. This enhances the distancing effect referred to above, while 
accentuating the moral issues associated with targeting from an entirely safe distance 
																																																								
18 Paul W. Kahn, The Paradox of Riskless Warfare, [2002] Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 2; Paul W. 
Kahn, War and Sacrifice in Kosovo, [1999] Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 1.  
19 Markus Gunneflo, Targeted Killing: A legal and Political History (CUP 2016), 157 and chapter 3 in general.  
20 See Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell UP 1996).  
21 With varying subtlety and critical stance the phallic symbolism of weapons, ranging from swords to military 
aircraft, has been an aesthetic trope. See Ada Cohen, Art in the Era of Alexander the Great: Paradigms of Manhood 
and their Cultural Traditions (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 175; Adrian Searle, ‘Fiona Banner’s Toys for 
Boys are a Turn-On at Tate Britain, The Guardian 28 June 2010, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2010/jun/28/tate-britain-fiona-banner1>. The flying of 
military planes in particular has often produced similar interpretations in the Freudian tradition. See Douglas 
D. Bond, who, as Psychiatric Adviser to the United States Army Air Force in Britain, in his The Love and Fear 
of Flying (1952), opined that ‘the combat aircraft…fulfills childhood desires for an exaggerated phallic 
power…The shape of many aircraft is strikingly phallic.’ in Ben Shephard, War of Nerves: Soldiers and 
Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Harvard University Press 2001) 295. See generally Kimberly Hutchings, 
‘Making Sense of Masculinity and War’ [2008] 10 Men and Masculinities 389. 
22 This legalization is charted, for the period between the 1970s and the early 2000s in Janina Dill, Legitimate 
Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing (OUP 2014).  
23 Ibid. 
24 This is the case with the Predator: 8.22m length; 14.8 wingspan; 512kg empty weight. The Reaper is larger: 
11m length; 20m wingspan; 2,223kg weight.  
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– moral issues on which international law remains agnostic, insofar as the principles 
of distinction and proportionality are satisfied.25  
 
However, when the distance is paired with the drone’s increasing self-reliance26 the 
trajectory is significantly advanced, qualitatively so, towards that of the increasing 
automation and the promise of ultimate autonomy of new weapons technologies.27 
There is something robotic about the drone – even though it is currently remotely 
piloted. Here the promise of the technology – the promise of technological self-
reliance, post-human rationality, post-human humanity28 -- can be seen in the 
object’s aesthetic, if perhaps not yet fully borne out in the object’s functionality and 
use. While the debate over the compatibility of the increasingly automated weapons 
technology with the law of armed conflict is raging, containing pessimists, 29 
optimists30 and policy-oriented pragmatists,31 the legal verdict is in abeyance until 
the technology is realized. Until then, the armed drone’s half-robotic character and 
incremental promise is a proxy for an ever-braver future new world.  
 
The legalisation, professionalisation and rationalisation evident in the image, use 
and promise of drones point towards the qualities and values of governance.32 The 
drone signifies that ‘war is governance’, 33  governance through targeted legal 
violence. Such ‘targeted governance’ can be seen as part of a wider trend in global 
governance and is ‘linked to the idea of efficient, apolitical, knowledge-driven 
“evidence-based” policy’.34 These particular qualities of (lethal) decision-making 
beg for and feed off the promise of technological perfection. Legalization, 
																																																								
25 A.P.V. Rogers, ‘Zero-Casualty Warfare’ [2000] IRRC 165, 179. 
26 The Predator’s endurance is 24 hours. The Reaper’s 14. The quest is ongoing: see Ben Sullivan, ‘The US 
Military is Developing a Drone That Can Fly For a Week Straight’ Motherboard (30 January 2017) 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-us-military-is-developing-a-drone-that-can-fly-for-a-
week-straight> accessed 19 February 2017.  
27 Full automation is defined as ‘A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without 
further intervention by a human operator.’ See US Department of Defense, ‘Autonomy in Weapon Systems, 
Directive 3000.09’, 21 November 2012, Glossary, Part II Definitions.  See also ICRC, ‘Report of the ICRC 
Expert Meeting on ‘Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects’, 26-28 
March 2014, Geneva 9 May 2014.  
28  Grégoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (Penguin 2015) 209. Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behaviour in 
Autonomous Robots (CRC Press 2009); Vik Kanwar, ‘Post-Human Humanitarian Law: The Law of War in the 
Age of Robotic Weapons’ [2011] Harvard National Security Journal 616. 
29  Noel Sharkey, ‘Automating Warfare: Lessons Learned from the Drones’ [2012] Journal of Law, 
Information & Science 140; Peter Asaro, ‘On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, 
Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal decision-Making’ [2013] IRRC 687. 
30 Arkin supra note 28..  
31 Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, ‘Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a 
Ban won’t work and how the laws of War Can’ [2013] Jen Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law 
Essay Series (Hoover Institution and Stanford University).   
32 See eg Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ [2000] 
International Organization 421. 
33 Cf Eyal Benvenisti and Amichai Cohen, ‘War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of the Laws of War 
from a Principal-Agent Perspective’ [2014] Michigan LR 1363. 
34 Marianna Valverde and Michael Lomas, ‘Insecurity and Targeted Governance’ in Wendy Larner and 
William Walters, Global Governmentality (Routledge 2004) 233, 245 in Gunneflo supra note 19. 
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professionalisation and rationalisation, through technology, are of course furthering 
the traditional –Enlightenment – quest of the perfectibility of man. 35  The 
technological infatuation with perfection, however, also reflects an impatience with 
the fallibility of human error-in-judgement, as well as a ‘worship [of] data-driven 
reliability and disdain [of] untested human intuition’.36 The armed drone is the tool 
to decrease human fallibility in war, before such fallibility, and humanity, is finally 
displaced by full automation.37   
 
The very qualities of the armed drone as a tool refer to and stand for the qualities 
of the system in which it is used. The promised sharpness of the tool accordingly 
ambitiously refers to the sharpness of the international legal system it serves and 
signifies. Perhaps a link could be made here with Raz’s famous theory of the 
minimal, formal qualities of the rule of law, where the legal system should be like a 
sharp knife, to be used for good or ill. 38 Raz’s functional minimalism aims at 
establishing formal qualities of legal systems, while circumventing unbridgeable 
disagreement in substantive moral and political judgement. And so it is that the 
armed drone’s promised qualities of sharp governance-in-war may allow society to 
eschew such judgement, leading to decreasing political participation 39  and the 
ultimate loss of human decision-making freedom.40 
    
  
Perspective 2  
The screen: An eyeless but all-seeing generator of images for those who target.  
 
For this promise of rational, professional and legalised governance to be realised, 
however, the drone as a high-tech tool needs to perform both its aggressive function 
and its professional/legalised function with efficiency and precision. While the 
object’s image in its hi-tech gloss in arms dealers’ catalogues may be perceived as 
supporting this further promise, ultimately the tool’s precision stands or falls on the 
basis of the quality of the images it generates for its operators, those who target. 
There are at least two levels of precision required here: in identification and in 
targeting.41 
 
The object is experienced by those operating it as a series of shapes that need to be 
																																																								
35 On the history and different directions of this quest the classic work is John Passmore, The Perfectibility of 
Man (Liberty Fund, 3rd ed., 2000).  
36 Roger Berkowitz, ‘Drones and the Question of “The Human”’ [2014] Ethics & International Affairs 159, 
162. 
37 See Arkin supra note 28 chapter 4.  
38 Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtues’ [1977] LQR 195.  
39 Chamayou (n 28) chapter 23 ‘The Fabrication of Political Automata’.  
40 Berkowitz supra note 36 169. 
41 See Chamayou supra note 28143 who also refers to the precision of the impact.  
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decrypted in order to be ‘fitted’ to the specific operational categories determined by 
the law, the rules of engagement, and operational policy. One aspect of this has to 
do with the quality of the picture the drone’s camera feeds to the screens in the 
virtual cockpit drone operators inhabit, complemented by maps and status updates. 
The pictures generated by the armed drones, paired with intelligence gathered 
through the surveillance function of the drone, allow for the distinction between 
civilian and military objects. When the target is a human being this distinction 
translates either in the military status of the individual, ideally indicated by the 
wearing of a uniform or a distinctive military emblem,42 or in the determination of 
whether the individual is a civilian ‘directly participating in hostilities’.43 Precision in 
identification and precision in targeting, that is the precision capacities of the object 
itself, are complemented by a third type of discriminatory precision, that of the 
policy that governs the use of the object (and which, perhaps, the object itself 
facilitates).  
  
The armed drone is at the very center of the interrelation of these three types of 
precision. What the image quality (still) lacks, is made up for through the ‘persistent 
stare’, the ‘unblinking eye’,44 the process of ‘target development’ through ‘pattern 
of life’ analysis45 and through the weaving of the enemy/criminal nexus, within 
which the targets develop their targetable quality either as identified individuals or 
as general types bearing a certain ‘signature’, in accordance with the targeting state’s 
policy.46 Accordingly, the ‘promise of precision’ that the object bears is not only 
one of visual depiction of individual targets. It is also one of depiction, analysis, 
construction of the area and society that is being surveyed and targeted. It is the 
promise of precision of ‘lethal surveillance’.47 While the object looks eyeless, it aims 
to be all-seeing, generating images through a screen, through which the operators 




42 Art 4 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949, entered into 
force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 135).  
43 Art 51(3) API. See also Nils Melzer (Legal Adviser, ICRC), Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009) 
available at <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf> accessed 17 November 
2016. 
44 The terms are used by the US military, specifically in leaked documents of the Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance Task Force. See Jeremy Scahill, The Assassination Complex (Simon & Schuster 2016).  
45 Chamayou supra note 28, chapter 5 and Derek Gregory, ‘From a view to kill: Drones and Late Modern 
War’ [2011] Theory, Culture and Society 188.  
46 See Department of Justice White Paper, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligence Agency against a 
U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force, (25 January 2011) in Jaffer (n 
12), 127 and Kevin Jon Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine: Signature Strikes and International Law’ 
[2013] Journal of International Criminal Justice 89.  
47 Katherine Hall Kindervater,  ‘The emergence of lethal surveillance: Watching and killing in the history of 
drone technology’ [2016] 47(3) Security Dialogue 223.. 
48 Scahill supra note 44, 40.   
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It is the qualities of the above experience that determine the relationship between 
the targeter and her target and the particular quality of the distancing effect, the 
removal from the ‘fog of war’. The cognitive uncertainty and emotional tension 
associated with the ‘fog of war’ has traditionally been perceived as a major obstacle 
in the regulation of human behaviour in war and the potential for accountability for 
that behaviour. This is reflected in the treaty texts deferring to the ‘military 
commander’s’ reasonable perception and anticipation,49 especially in establishing 
the onerous requirements for individual criminal liability for the war crime of 
disproportionate attack.50  
 
The object’s promised removal of this ‘fog of war’ has proved no panacea.51 Nor is 
the physical distancing straightforward. There are two kinds of problems so far 
identified. The first one, perhaps to be expected, is one of ‘joystick mentality’, of 
bureaucratically supported levity, of lawyerly enhanced nonchalance in deciding to 
‘kill the bug’ on the screen.52 The other problem is that the cognitive and emotional 
fragmentation of action and consequence, consciously or unconsciously, effects a 
different sort of trauma on the targeter. As Chamayou puts it, ‘[t]his new 
combination of physical distance and ocular proximity gives the lie to the classic 
law of distance: the great distance no longer renders the violence more abstract or 
more impersonal but, on the contrary, makes it more graphic, more personalized.’53 
The distancing between the targeter and the targeted effected through the object is 
not just physical, but entails an element of estrangement and alienation, a moral 
distancing, which however does not, ultimately, lighten the load of killing.  
 
And so it is that neither the promise of precision nor that of rational removal from 
the ‘fog of war’ are entirely satisfied. Neither are the object’s promises of 
professionalisation and legalisation, at least in the relationship between the drones’ 
operators and the society which has ostensibly engaged them. So far the use of the 
drone, perhaps through no inherent technological characteristic of its own, is one 
																																																								
49 See Robert Sloane, ‘Puzzles of Proportion and the 'Reasonable Military Commander': Reflections on the 
Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality’ [2015] Harvard National Security Journal 299 and Jens 
David Ohlin, ‘Targeting and the Concept of Intent’ [2013] Michigan JIL 79. 
50 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, 2187 
UNTS 3) article 8(2)(b)(iv): ‘Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated’ (emphasis added).  
51 See e.g. Micah Zenko and Amelia Mae Wolf, ‘Drones Kill More Civilians than Pilots Do’ Foreign Policy (25 
April 2016) at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/drones-kill-more-civilians-than-pilots-do/ accessed 
17 November 2016. 
52 A ‘bug splat’ is reported to be the military slang for a person killed through a drone strike. See Michael 
Hastings, ‘The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America Goes to War in Secret, 16 April 2012, Rolling 
Stone  <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-rise-of-the-killer-drones-how-america-goes-to-
war-in-secret-20120416#ixzz3x8q0LdEC>  
53 Chamayou (n 27) 117.  
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of secrecy. The secrecy of the object’s operation has, perhaps not inevitably, meant 
that, especially in the US, the programme has mostly been administered not by the 
military but by the intelligence services. The implications of this are, firstly, that CIA 
operatives are not members of the armed forces under article 4(A)(1) of Geneva 
Convention III and do not necessarily satisfy the criteria of privileged combatancy 
under article 4(A)(2). They may consequently be seen to act outside the recognised 
legal categories, lose the combatant’s privilege to kill and may accordingly be open 
to prosecution for murder.54 Secondly, the promise of legalisation does not seem to 
extend to meaningful reviewability of the use of this sharp tool, even though 
legalisation is sometimes relied on to deliver us from the evil of the object’s 
misuse.55  
 
For better or worse it seems that, so far, secrecy is part of the object’s mystique. 
While ‘accountability regimes’ are being suggested,56 the fear is that the combination 
of secrecy and distancing in killing, enhanced by the prospect of further removing 
individuals from the operation of increasingly autonomous weapons, will substitute 
the object for persons. The formal qualities of the object and the high-tech 
professionalism of its operation suffice; scrutiny is deferred; no external review is 
necessary. As with the dehumanization of war as governance,57 the function of the 
armed drone’s promise of precision may very well end up being its betrayal. For all 
the images it generates, the armed drone seems to contribute to moral and political 
concealment and mystification.   
 
  
Perspective 3.  
A dot in the sky, or maybe not even that: A constant and invisible threat for those 
who are targeted. 
  
The all-seeing precision associated with the armed drone is experienced rather 
differently in the areas under its surveillance and fire. There, the object is not really 
seen. It is near invisible, a dot in the sky, and it is faintly audible, signified by ‘[t]he 
																																																								
54 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 84, Human Rights Council, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) para 71.  
55 In the context of the future practice of President Trump, see Harold Hongju Koh, ‘National Security Legal 
Advice in the New Administration’ Just Security (16 November 2016) 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/34507/national-security-legal-advice-administration/> and see Chase 
Madar, Rules of Disengagement: How the Lawyerly Discourse of Drone Warfare Misses the Point' Bookforum 
(December/January 2017) http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/023_04/16816 accessed 17 November 
2016.  
56 See Symposium: Toward a Drone Accountability Regime in [2015] Ethics & International Affairs 15. 
57 See above notes 32-40 and text.  
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buzz of a distant propeller [as] a constant reminder of imminent death.’ 58 
Nevertheless, its faint visual and audible marks are sufficient to overwhelm the 
targeted. The sound the object emits communicates threat and establishes fear.59 
The object’s threatened presence is sufficient to contaminate a clear blue sky: ‘I no 
longer love clear blue skies. In fact, I now prefer grey skies. The drones do not fly 
when the skies are grey.’60 The perspective of the population ‘under drones’, beyond 
the targeted and the killed, highlights that measuring precision based purely on 
casualties and applying the legal principles of distinction and proportionality 
exclusively in relation to ‘loss of civilian life’ doesn’t fully capture the armed drone’s 
effect and radius. It is perhaps an inescapable feature of the object’s current qualities 
that the populations under its persistent stare experience its promise of 
professionalized precision as generalized threat and daily terror.61  
 
Because, ultimately, the armed drone, not due to any inherent technological feature, 
but in how it is used and how it is perceived, is an object at the center of an entirely 
asymmetrical relationship. This is the final promise of the object of the armed 
drone, one of asymmetry, one of the military and technological invulnerability of 
those who employ the object. In embodying asymmetry, the drone is at the heart 
of a change of paradigm that re-imagines war as the top-down ‘administration of 
violence’,62 part and parcel of the realisation of war as governance. Drones are not 
made to destroy other drones. 63  This asymmetry, together with legalisation, 
professionalisation, and rationalisation, complete the picture of the drone as a tool 
of administration.64 
  
Of course, this asymmetrical element is not necessarily inherent in the object itself, 
it is only reflective of a historical moment now almost past. Even if the 
specifications of the drone facilitate and fit with the practice of surveillance plus air-
to-ground targeting of technologically much less advanced enemies, this ‘promise 
																																																								
58  See David Rohde, The Drone War, Reuters (26 January 2012), 
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59 Lawrence English, ‘The Sound of Fear: From Long Range Protester-Deterring Acoustic Devices to 
Military Drones’ The Conversation (7 October 2016) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-08/the-sound-
of-fear/7913512> accessed 17 November 2016. 
60 Zubair Rehman, whose grandmother was killed by a drone strike, quoted in Derek Gregory, ‘Little Boys 
and Blue Skies’ Geographical Imaginations (3 September 2015) 
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2016. 
61 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice 
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in Pakistan (September 2012). 
62 Paul W. Kahn, ‘Imagining Warfare’ [2013] EJIL 199. 
63 Air-to-air combat technology is not currently used. Anti-drone technology is focusing on ground-to-air 
missiles.  
64 See Eliav Lieblich and Eyal Benvenisti, ‘The obligation to exercise discretion in warfare: Why autonomous 
weapons systems are unlawful in Susanne Beck, Nehal Bhuta et al. (eds), Autonomous Weapons Systems – Law, 
Ethics, and Policy (CUP 2016) 245.  
	 12	
of invulnerability’ is one more promise that will be broken. Leaving aside the 
unknowns of qualitative technological shifts, the proliferation, including 
privatisation, of the existing technology ensures the battle for asymmetry and 
invulnerability is to continue. 65  The present state of asymmetry in military 
technology exemplified by the armed drone is contingent and precarious. This is 
one more reason to resist the mythical, paradigm-setting function of the object of 
the armed drone in the relation between war and law.  
 
The other notable tale of asymmetrical weapons technology – the invention of the 
rifle and its use in colonial wars in the late 19th century – is instructive. Its role in 
establishing asymmetry was crucial and decisive, so much so that post-1870 armed 
confrontations ‘resembled hunting more than war’, 66  a metaphor revealingly 
revived today.67 The vertiginous asymmetry and comfortable invulnerability can be 
glimpsed at the battle of Omdurman in the Sudan, 1898. Churchill, a participant, 
described how the British infantry ‘steadily and solidly’ fired against the Sudanese 
Dervishes in ‘the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over 
barbarians.’ The radical asymmetry in vulnerability between targeters and targeted, 
as enabled by the technological object, was determinative. As Churchill put it, ‘the 
mere physical act became tedious’.68  
 
The object of the rifle, however, did not remain confined to that particular 
relationship of asymmetry and was even instrumental to what came after. The 
targeter/targeted relationship of colonial technology and tactics facilitated the 
carnage and stalemate, the ‘total war’ that was the First World War:69 ‘The effect of 
modern infantry weapons on the battlefields of Europe  was quite the opposite of 
what it had been in Africa. Instead of bringing about the quick and easy success the 
European powers had become used to, the new firearms made victory impossible.’70 
Whether a similar fate awaits the drone, the symbol of ‘post-modern war’ as object 
of future total war, can only be a matter of speculation.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Normalizing Endless War 
 
This chapter has used the object of the armed drone – its technical characteristics, 
																																																								
65 Samuel Moyn, ‘Drones and Imagination: A Response to Paul Kahn’ [2013] EJIL 227.  
66 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (OUP 
1981) 115. 
67  See George A. Crawford, Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare (JSOU 2009); 
Chamayou supra note 28 at 32 quoting then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: “How do we 
organize the Department of Defense for manhunts?”  
68 Winston Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (Longman’s, Green and Co, 
1899) in Headrick supra note 66 at 118. 
69 Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western 
Front, 191401918 (CUP, 2000). 
70 Headrick supra note 66, 124.  
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its materiality, its aesthetics, and the way it is perceived– to discuss its significance 
in the evolution of the relationship between law and war and assess and critique the 
present moment it signifies. The armed drone currently signifies, symbolises, 
promises and mythologises the ‘new way of war’: war as governance, sharp and 
precise; war as professionalised vertical administration of violence; war as a 
fundamentally asymmetrical relationship between the targeted and the targeter both 
materially and morally. These promises are at least partially betrayed. Too often, the 
armed drone, either inherently or at least in its current use, entails indistinction and 
relies on and creates mystification. The war particularly associated with armed 
drones, the ‘war on terror’, is widely referred to as the ‘forever war’, 71  the 
‘everywhere war’,72 ‘a clean and endless war’.73 War is spreading and is increasingly 
normalised. Such normalisation through the object-symbol, to recall Barthes,74 ‘in 
the eyes of the myth consumer…transforms history into nature’. For all the object’s 
forceful material and aesthetic qualities, this transformation should be resisted. The 
international law categories and structures related to the armed drone in this essay 
are crucial in appreciating the object’s past, in critiquing its present, and in 
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